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Castro Regime Collapse to End U.S. Problem, Ex-CIA Aide Says

A former assistant director | Cuba today is in terrible to improve living conditions tion's problems with Cuba he said. would be solved when the Castro regime collapses of its own weight.

Dr. Max F. Millikan dis-Community College to deliver a lecture on the politics of underdeveloped nations.

He is director of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served President Truman and its serving President Kennedy as adviser said, we would provide Red eign governments to our own on foreign aid. As assistant propagandists the opportuni-CIA director he served un-der President Truman in 1951 and 1952.

He said he believed that in spite of recent reports to the contrary, Soviet rockets and other military threats had been removed from Cuba.

"We have done all we can do in helping the downfall of the Castro government in re- international politics. moving its prime market for sugar and other products," he

of the Central Intelligence economic shape and the gov- and the opportunities for the Agency said yesterday the ha- ernment will eventually fall, people.

cussed Cuba as he arrived on prestige of the Cuban experistable governments in the American countries.

> Cuba has provided much propaganda and support to be little threat to us. Latin American Communists. Its fall must work to our advantage, he said.

If we did anything more to ty to say that he fell because of our intervention and not because of the failure in his theory.

IN HIS TALK before the college student body Millikan said opponents of the U.S. foreign aid program with the Foreign Aid program call it Russian, he said our program the "Boys' Club Approach" to

Just as the Boys' Club com-

bats delinquency by teaching new skills and developing new approaches, so does the foreign aid policy use these methods in combatting com munism and other totalitarian theories.

ANY GOVERNMENT, whether it be totalitarian or i democratic, must maintain itself, he said. It must do so by one of three methods or a combination of all three.

The methods are: 1. Suppression of all opposition by jailing or shooting the opponents.

2. Developing fear of an external threat, such as a former colonial power or the former regime.

3. To do something constructive within the country

The chief aim of the U.S. THE MAIN CONCERN of give as much support as posthis country, he added, is not sible to the third method. In the threat of rockets, but the that way we can help build the campus of Mohawk Valley ment with the other Latin emerging underdeveloped countries. Those countries, he said, when stabilized, will

Although foreign aid in any large degree is new since World War II, he said that it If we did anything more to affect the fall of Castro, he to promote stability in forbest interests. That is why it often appeared that we were bent on maintaining the government in power such as was the case with the Batista government in Cuba.

IN COMPARING the U.S. was aimed at solid, long term development, whereas the "I like that term," he said, Russians were interested in "because it described exactly the more spectacular, short what we are trying to do." term approach.

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